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RECENT CASE
ATTEMPTS BY EMPLOYERS TO PRECLUDE PAYMENT OF
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Can a private agreement between employer and employee affect a sub-
sequent claim by the employee for unemployment compensation benefits?
What is the effect of the receipt of an income from a retirement or pension
plan upon a claimants eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits?
What interpretation is to be placed upon a statute which provides that a preg-
nant claimant is not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits after
seven and one-half months of pregnancy?
These questions were decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for the
first time in two recent cases involving claimants in two of the most contro-
verted areas of unemployment compensation administration: retired workers
and pregnant women.'
In the retired workers case, Warner Co. v. Unemployment Compensation
Bd. of Review,' Antonio Gianfelice, while receiving a pension from his former
employer, applied for unemployment compensation benefits. His application
was approved by the local office, but on appeal was denied by the referee. The
Board of Review reversed the referee, and it, in turn, was reversed by the
Superior Court.'
The Superior Court, in denying benefits, based its decision on an interpre-
tation of the retirement provisions of Gianfelice's union contract with the em-
ployer. The contract stated that an employee who had reached the age of 68
could continue in his employment only with the consent of the employer.'
1 For a more general discussion of these and other controverted areas of the Unemployment
Compensation Law, see: Observations on Unemployment Compensation, 63 DICK. L. REV. 344.
2 396 Pa. 545, 153 A.2d 906 (1959). Also cited as: Gianfelice Unemployment Compensation
Case.
3 Warner Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 186 Pa. Super. 186, 142 A.2d
739 (1958).
4 The provisions relating to retirement are as follows:
1. Each participant who, while an employee of the Company has attained age 65 on July
1, 1950, or attains age 65 thereafter, shall be eligible to retire on July 1, 1950, or his attain-
ment of age 65, whichever is later, and, if he has completed 10 or more years of continuous
service, shall be eligible for retirement income benefits computed in accordance with Section
V hereof.
"2. A participant may remain in service of the Company after his attainment of age 68 or
July 1, 1952, whichever last occurs, only with the consent of the company and upon his




Three of the five judges who heard the appeal felt that termination of the
employment under the provisions of the contract constituted a "voluntary quit"
by the claimant5 despite the fact that claimant wanted to continue working.
These judges held that the termination was voluntary in a legal sense, i.e.
since the union was the bargaining agent for the employee-claimant, he was
bound by the terms of the agreement made for him and, therefore, he had
agreed to retire at age 68. The individual's desire to continue working was
considered meaningless in the face of his agreement to retire. There was
dicta in the case to the effect that claimant was not the type person intended to
be covered by the provisions of the unemployment compensation law, but other
than that the case turned entirely upon the contract interpretation.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed. It refused to interpret the
rather "ambigious" I provisions of the union contract and wholly rejected any
"contract-interpretation" approach to eligibility determination. The proposi-
tion that an employee is bound by his union's agreement with the employer was
affirmed, but it was held that such an agreement could have no effect upon
the individual claimant's eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits.
The court held that a determination of eligibility depends upon whether the
claimant actually, voluntarily terminated his employment. In the words of
the court: ". . . the factual matrix at the time of separation should govern." I
Since the main purpose of contract provisions of this type is to provide
for job security, the court felt that it is anomalous to say that the employee who
loses the protection of the job security provisions of his contract through no
fault of his own is in any position different from the employee who has never
had a contract. Therefore, since the purpose of the Unemployment Compen-
sation Law is to protect the employees from the rigors of unemployment caused
by, among other causes, arbitrary dismissal, this claimant comes within the
class of persons designed to be protected.
This would have been sufficient to decide the case at bar, but, perhaps
through a desire to settle definitely and finally all the collateral issues of this
case, the court went further and stated:
... Where a statute of the Commonwealth expresses a public policy designed
to alleviate a condition of possible distress among the public or a segment
thereof and explicitly proscribes waiver of the benefits of the act, no private
agreement, however valid between the parties, can operate as such a wavier .... 8
(Emphasis added.)
5Rhodes, P.J., Wright, and Watkins, J.J. Ervin and Woodside dissented,
6 Warner Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 396 Pa. 545,550, 153 A.2d 906,
909 (1959).
7Warner Co. supra note 6 at 551, 153 A.2d at 909.
8 Warner Co. supra note 6 at 554, 153 A.2d at 911.
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The court was referring to section 701 of the Unemployment Compensation
Law, which states, "No agreement by an employee to waive, release, or com-
mute his rights to compensation, or any other rights under this act, shall be
valid." 9 Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed earlier decisions of the Superior
Court which have held that the receipt of pension benefits will not preclude
a claimant from unemployment compensation.1"
On the same day that the Warner case was decided, the Supreme Court
a'lso handed down an opinion in the case of Smith v. Unemployment Compensa-
tion Bd. of Review." This case involved a pregnant claimant who had been
"laid-off" pursuant to a company policy which forbade female employees to
continue working beyond their fifth month of pregnancy.
In passing upon this case, the Superior Court had reasoned that Section 701
of the Unemployment Compensation Law did not apply because this was a "rea-
sonable condition" of employment. 2 That is, the individual safety of the em-
ployee was a major consideration of the company in ordaining the rule. Once
again, the claimant's desire to continue working was considered meaningless.
However, the Supreme Court ignored this reasoning and decided this case on
the same basis as the Warner case. The court reiterated the statement quoted
above to the effect that no private agreement, however valid between the par-
ties, can have an operative effect upon the determination of a claimant's eligi-
bility for unemployment compensation benefits.
In this case, as in the Warner case, the court went further than necessary
to decide the case. A 1953 amendment to the Unemployment Compensation
Law provides that a claimant shall be conclusively presumed to be unavailable
for work after seven and one-half months of pregnancy, and until one month
after the conclusion of the pregnancy."8 This was interpreted as placing the
burden of proving that the claimant is unable to work upon those contesting
her eligibility.
In clarifying the status of claimants in both of these areas the Supreme
Court has offered stability to a segment of the law that has been in a constant
state of confusion. Furthermore, their decision should greatly simplify the
administration of the law. In order to comply with the Superior Court hold-
ing, it would have been necessary to construe each new contract in order to
determine whether the claimant, through his union, had actually agreed not to
9
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §861 (1937).
10 Pendleton Unemployment Compensation Case, 167 Pa. Super, 256, 75 A.2d 3 (1950). Mar-
tin Unemployment Compensation Case, 174 Pa. Super. 412, 101 A.2d 421 (1953).
11 396 Pa. 557, - A.2d - (1959). Also cited as Smith Unemployment Compensation
Case.
12 187 Pa. Super. 560, 146 A.2d 59 (1958).
13 PA. STAT, ANN. tit. 43 § 801(d) (1953).
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work after the happening of a contingency. Investigation into the motives of
both labor and management at the time the contract was made and, when
available, conduct of both under the contract would be involved to such an
extent that litigation would be necessary in nearly every case. Ignoring the
contract leaves the administrators of the law with a comparatively simple fac-
tual determination of whether or not the claimant wanted to continue working
and was eligible to do so.
Criticism might be leveled at these decisions on the basis that section
701 was intended to prevent the employer from taking advantage of the un-
equal position of the job-seeker by requiring a waiver of unemployment com-
pensation benefits as a pre-requisite to employment. But, the critics might say,
the employee who is represented by a labor union is not in an unequal position,
and such contracts should be allowed as part of the give and take of the bar-
gaining table. 1 4 This is true, as far as it goes. However, as a practical matter
the individual union member is not in the position of the ordinary principal.
He normally has very little to say about the provisions of the contract he wishes
to endorse and those he wishes to reject. When unemployment strikes, he will
feel the rigors of it just as strongly as the claimant who has no union. The
subsequent effect upon the economy of the nation is precisely what was in-
tended to be avoided by the legislation. "
It is unfortunate, however, that the court chose to make such an unexcep-
tionable statement concerning the utilization of a private agreement in deter-
mining the eligibility of a claimant, and in the same case to affirm the right of
one receiving a pension to draw unemployment compensation benefits. It
would not be unusual for a pension plan to contain the provision that all pay-
ments under the plan will cease whenever the beneficiary secures any remuner-
ative employment. It is a rare individual who would be willing to accept em-
ployment at the minimum wage when he is already drawing more than that
amount with his pension and unemployment benefits combined, especially
since both would cease upon his return to work."
Allowing benefits to such a claimant presents the administrators of the
law with a very difficult problem. It is possible that such a claimant could
draw benefits for many weeks before employment is even proffered. It is a
simple matter in any labor market to avoid being hired without actually refus-
14 It is noted that the employee contributes nothing to the Unemployment Compensation Fund,
while the employer's contribution is a percentage of the wages paid based upon the amount of
money in the fund and his unemployment record.
15 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 752(1952).
16 This situation was dealt with in the Pendleton Unemployment Compensation Case, 167 Pa.
Super. 256, 75 A.2d 3(1950). The Superior Court, although it was dicta, said that such a
provision in the pension agreement should result in disqualification.
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ing to accept employment. A prospective employer is not likely to hire an
applicant whom he feels does not want the job. Further, it is too much of a
burden to ask the employer to hire this type so that availability might be
tested.17 If the court had considered this particular situation, it is quite possible
that it would have made an exception to its rule; as it stands now this question
will probably have to be litigated.
These cases have resolved four areas of conflict with the following rules.
First, no private agreement will have any effect upon the eligibility of a
claimant for benefits. Second, investigation as to the fact of whether the em-
ployer or the claimant caused the termination of the employment relation will
be confined to matters of fact at the time of the separation. Third, the idea that
one who is receiving other income should not be the recipient of unemployment
compensation is rejected. This tends to remove the onus of "charitable pay-
ments" from unemployment compensation. Fourth, the fact of pregnancy will
have no effect upon a claimant's eligibility unless the pregnancy actually renders
her unavailable for work.'"
If, as contended by the Superior Court, the legislature did not intend pay-
ments to be made under the above circumstances, the burden is now upon the
legislature to make specific changes. It would seem that the Supreme Court's
ruling upon the "factual matrix" is the most sensible approach. Obviously not
every member of the two groups is in reality a member of the labor market, but
this is a fact that ought to be determined individually, so that those who are
able and available for employment will not suffer because of the disability
of others.
JOHN P. THOMAS.
17 Refusal to accept suitable employment is cause for disqualification. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43
§ 802(a) (1953).
18 One must be both able and available for work. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 801(d) (1953).
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